Yemen’s “Gate of Tears” Is Becoming the World’s Next Great Shipping Test

As fighting intensifies near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow passage connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean is exposing how quickly a regional conflict can disrupt oil markets, container shipping and household prices around the world.

By Karla Alvarado Follow

Published at 6:04 p.m. EDT

The name sounds like a warning inherited from another age.

Bab el-Mandeb, commonly translated from Arabic as the “Gate of Tears,” is a narrow waterway between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. For centuries, it has carried merchants, sailors, soldiers and migrants between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Today, it carries something even more consequential: a substantial share of the energy, consumer goods and raw materials moving between Asia, Europe and the Mediterranean.

Now the gate is under renewed pressure.

Fighting in Yemen has intensified as the Iran-aligned Houthi movement advances along the country’s Red Sea coast toward the strategically vital strait. At the same time, Houthi forces have increased attacks on Saudi cities and energy infrastructure, while Saudi and Yemeni aircraft have conducted retaliatory strikes, according to Reuters.

The growing danger has immediate consequences for Yemen’s civilians. It also creates a second major maritime emergency at a moment when traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, another essential oil chokepoint, has already fallen dramatically.

On Monday, only four commodity vessels passed through Hormuz, compared with a prewar daily average of about 125, Reuters reported. Bab el-Mandeb traffic also declined, falling from 28 vessel transits to 21 in a single day, according to the same shipping data.

Those numbers offer a stark picture. Two of the world’s most important waterways are under pressure at the same time. One controls access to the Persian Gulf. The other controls the southern entrance to the Red Sea and, by extension, access to the Suez Canal.

The possibility of simultaneous disruption is no longer an abstract exercise for military planners. It is a live economic threat.

A narrow passage with an enormous reach

Bab el-Mandeb sits between Yemen to the northeast and Djibouti and Eritrea to the southwest. It connects the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea with the Red Sea, creating a maritime bridge between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

A ship traveling from Asia to Europe through the Suez Canal must first pass through Bab el-Mandeb. That makes the strait the southern doorway to the entire Red Sea trade corridor.

The waterway’s narrowest section is only about 18 miles wide. Perim Island, which belongs to Yemen, divides the passage into two navigable channels. Its geography places ships relatively close to shore, where they can be exposed to missiles, drones, mines, small boats and coastal surveillance systems.

This vulnerability helps explain why attacks launched from Yemen have affected shipping far beyond the country’s borders.

The importance of Bab el-Mandeb is sometimes overshadowed by the Strait of Hormuz, which carries a larger volume of petroleum. Yet the two waterways play different roles. Hormuz is the primary exit from the Persian Gulf. Bab el-Mandeb is a gateway connecting Asian production centers and Middle Eastern energy exporters with Europe.

Closing Hormuz would restrict direct access to major oil and gas producers. Closing Bab el-Mandeb would force many ships to abandon the Red Sea and Suez route, sailing instead around the southern tip of Africa.

That alternate route exists, but it comes at a price.

The long road around Africa

Ships that avoid Bab el-Mandeb generally reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. Depending on the vessel’s origin and destination, the detour can add thousands of nautical miles and roughly one to two weeks to a voyage.

Those extra miles require more fuel, more crew time and more ships to move the same amount of cargo. Longer voyages also tighten the availability of containers and vessel capacity.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development found that Red Sea disruptions had already caused sharp changes in shipping patterns after attacks escalated in late 2023. By mid-2024, rerouting had increased global vessel demand by approximately 3 percent and demand for container ships by about 12 percent, according to a later UNCTAD assessment.

Those percentages may appear modest, but shipping is a capacity-sensitive business. A relatively small reduction in available ships can produce a much larger increase in freight rates, particularly when retailers are rebuilding inventories or exporters are racing to meet seasonal deadlines.

The final cost can reach consumers in subtle ways.

A furniture order may take longer to arrive. A European factory may pay more for Asian components. A grocery supplier may face higher transportation and refrigeration costs. Clothing companies may move urgent shipments by air, raising expenses again. Insurers may charge ships more to enter a conflict zone, even when the ship is not carrying oil or military cargo.

The price of disruption does not remain on the water. It moves through warehouses, factories, stores and household budgets.

An oil route under pressure from both ends

Bab el-Mandeb is also an important petroleum corridor. The U.S. Energy Information Administration identifies it as one of the world’s major oil transit chokepoints, connecting energy shipments from the Middle East and Asia with markets in Europe and North America.

Oil and liquefied natural gas movements through the strait had already fallen sharply after shipping attacks began in late 2023. According to the EIA, disruptions pushed companies to reroute cargoes, particularly those considered vulnerable to attack.

The current crisis adds another layer of risk.

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline was designed in part to provide an alternative to Hormuz. It moves oil from the country’s eastern producing regions to Yanbu, a Red Sea export terminal. Under normal conditions, that gives Saudi Arabia the ability to place millions of barrels per day on the Red Sea side of the Arabian Peninsula without sending them through Hormuz.

But the pipeline itself has come under attack.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the route could return to service within days, although industry estimates cited by Reuters suggested repairs could take substantially longer. The pipeline normally carries about 4 million to 5 million barrels per day, making its availability central to efforts to compensate for lost Hormuz traffic.

Even when the pipeline operates, oil loaded at Yanbu still depends on safe navigation through the Red Sea. Cargoes traveling south must eventually pass Bab el-Mandeb.

That exposes a difficult strategic reality. A pipeline can bypass one chokepoint only to deliver its cargo toward another.

If the threat near Yemen continues to grow, Saudi Arabia and its trading partners may find that their most important escape route from the Hormuz crisis is itself becoming less dependable.

Yemen’s battlefield is moving closer to global trade

The Houthis have demonstrated an ability to threaten commercial shipping with comparatively inexpensive weapons. Drones and missiles do not need to sink every vessel to change corporate behavior. They only need to create enough uncertainty that shipowners, charterers, insurers and crews consider the route unacceptable.

The economics of maritime risk are psychological as well as physical.

A single successful strike can lead to higher insurance premiums across an entire region. A warning from a naval authority can cause companies to pause voyages. A credible threat against a particular flag, cargo or corporate owner can force a vessel to change course before an attack occurs.

This is one reason vessel counts matter. Falling traffic can signal that companies are responding to perceived danger even without a formal closure of the strait.

The distinction between controlling territory and controlling a waterway is also important. A force does not necessarily need complete military control over both shores to make commercial passage dangerous. Coastal missiles, drones, mines and small attack craft can create significant risk from only one side.

Reports of Houthi territorial gains near the Red Sea therefore deserve close attention, but claims made during active combat require caution. Front lines can change quickly, and statements issued by governments and armed groups may be incomplete or designed to influence public opinion.

The most reliable indicators will include independently verified territorial changes, commercial vessel movements, maritime security advisories and insurance pricing.

The human crisis behind the shipping maps

The economic story cannot be separated from the humanitarian emergency unfolding on land.

More than 100,000 people have been displaced inside Yemen by the renewed fighting, according to the United Nations, while thousands of others have attempted to cross the sea to Djibouti. UNHCR reported on September 15 that the escalating conflict was driving both internal displacement and new refugee arrivals.

More than 2,000 Yemenis had already reached Djibouti, according to an Associated Press report. Fuel shortages have made escape more difficult, leaving some families unable to obtain transportation to ports or pay for passage across the strait.

Djibouti, one of the closest destinations, has limited capacity to absorb a large and sudden influx. The same waterway viewed by global businesses as a trade route is viewed by fleeing families as a dangerous path to safety.

Inside Yemen, disrupted communications, damaged roads and insecurity are hampering humanitarian operations. Movement restrictions can prevent aid agencies from reaching displaced communities. Fuel shortages affect ambulances, water pumps, food delivery and electricity generation.

Shipping disruption can deepen those hardships. Yemen depends heavily on imports for food, fuel and medicine. Higher freight costs, fewer port calls or damage to port infrastructure can quickly translate into scarcity and inflation.

The “Gate of Tears” is therefore more than a strategic metaphor. For civilians trapped between armed forces, it describes a real geography of danger.

Why the Suez Canal is part of this story

Egypt is not a direct party to Yemen’s fighting, but its economy is exposed to the consequences.

The Suez Canal earns revenue every time a commercial vessel uses the route. When ships avoid Bab el-Mandeb, many also avoid Suez because they have already chosen the path around Africa.

This means instability near Yemen can reduce Egyptian canal income without any attack occurring inside Egyptian territory.

The effect illustrates the interconnected nature of maritime chokepoints. Bab el-Mandeb and Suez are geographically separate, but commercially they operate as parts of the same corridor. One is the southern entrance. The other is the northern shortcut.

If the entrance becomes unsafe, the shortcut loses much of its value.

Reduced canal traffic can strain Egypt’s foreign currency earnings at a time when the country must pay for imports and service external debt. It can also shift business toward ports in southern Africa, creating congestion and new infrastructure demands far from the original conflict.

What American consumers could notice

Bab el-Mandeb may seem distant from the United States, but American consumers and companies are not insulated from its disruption.

The United States is less dependent on imported Middle Eastern crude than it was in previous decades, yet oil is priced in a global market. A supply interruption in one region can raise benchmark prices elsewhere. Higher crude prices can affect gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, plastics and agricultural transportation.

Container shipping is another transmission point.

U.S. companies that import products from Asia through European distribution networks can face delays and higher rates. Manufacturers may pay more for specialized parts. Retailers may need to order inventory earlier or hold more stock, increasing storage costs. Airlines may face higher fuel expenses if energy markets remain unsettled.

Not every added cost reaches shoppers immediately. Companies sometimes absorb increases, renegotiate contracts or accept smaller margins. Persistent disruption, however, makes absorption harder.

Consumers should be skeptical of claims that one troubled waterway automatically determines the price of every product. Supply chains are more complicated than that. Yet it would be equally misleading to dismiss Bab el-Mandeb as a remote maritime problem.

The strait is one of the places where geopolitics can become a shipping surcharge, an insurance bill and eventually a higher retail price.

What happens next

The most favorable scenario is a reduction in hostilities, greater protection for commercial vessels and a gradual return of normal shipping patterns. Even then, companies may wait before resuming Red Sea voyages. Confidence usually returns more slowly than traffic disappears.

A prolonged but limited conflict would preserve some vessel movement while keeping insurance and freight costs elevated. Large carriers might continue to avoid the route, while operators with different risk tolerances could keep sailing through.

The most dangerous scenario would involve sustained attacks, mining, major territorial changes near the strait or a direct confrontation involving regional or outside naval forces. That could cause traffic to fall much further and force the Cape of Good Hope route to become the default for a larger portion of global commerce.

Several indicators deserve close monitoring:

Daily vessel transit numbers through Bab el-Mandeb
Houthi territorial movement along Yemen’s Red Sea coast
Missile and drone attacks on ports, tankers and energy infrastructure
Marine insurance premiums and war-risk exclusions
Carrier announcements about Red Sea service
Conditions at Yanbu and the Saudi East-West Pipeline
Displacement figures inside Yemen and refugee arrivals in Djibouti
Suez Canal transit and revenue data

The world has spent months focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, and rightly so. But the mounting pressure around Yemen shows that energy security cannot be understood by watching a single point on the map.

Bab el-Mandeb is the other gate. It is narrower than the global economy would like, more dangerous than commercial planners can ignore and more deeply tied to civilian suffering than freight statistics reveal.

Its name may be ancient, but the warning it carries is entirely modern. When the Gate of Tears trembles, the consequences travel far beyond Yemen’s shores.

Reporting note

This article is based on independently reviewed reporting, official energy data, United Nations assessments and maritime trade analysis available as of publication. Statements and figures are attributed to their originating organizations or news agencies, and battlefield claims have been presented with appropriate caution because conditions remain fluid.

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